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TheCyclical Behavior
of the Term Structure
of Interest Rates Reuben A. Kessel
EXPLANATIONS OF THE TERM STRUCTURE
OF INTEREST RATES
It is the thesis of this investigation that the term structure of interest
rates can be explained better by a combination of the expectations and
liquidity preference hypotheses than by either hypothesis alone. Alter-
natively, these two hypotheses can be viewed as complementary ex-
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planations of the same phenomenon—the term structure of interest
rates. The evidence to be examined in support of this view falls into
two classes. One is the findings of previous investigators; the works
of Macaulay, Culbertson, Meiselman, Walker, and Hickman contain
evidence relevant for evaluating the substantive merits of this thesis.
The other class consists of evidence gathered as part of the present
investigation.
What 78theExpectations Hypothesis
The expectations hypothesis has been enunciated by Fisher, Keynes,
Hicks, Lutz, and others.' It has had widespread appeal for theoretical
economists primarily as a result of its consistency with the way similar
phenomena in other markets, particularly futures markets,are ex-
plained. In constrast,this hypothesis has been widely rejected by
empirically minded economists and practical men of affairs. It was re-
jected by economists because investigators have been unable to pro-
duce evidence of a relationship between the term structure of interest
rates and expectations of future short-term rates. (Others have found it
difficult to accept the view that long- and short-term securities are
perfect substitutes for one another in the market.) Meiselman contends
that previous investigators have not devised operational implications
of the expectations hypothesis. Moreover, he contends, they have ex-
amined propositions which were mistakenly attributed to the expecta-
tions hypothesis, and when these propositions were found to be false,
they rejected the expectations hypothesis.2
Briefly, the expectations hypothesis asserts that a long-term rate
constitutes an average (a weighted average in the case of coupon-
bearing securities)of expected future short-term rates.It says that
forward rates (or marginal rates of interest)constitute unbiased es-
timates of future spot rates.3 It is based on the assumption that short-
'See Friedrich A. Lutz, "The Structure of Interest Rates," in the American
Economic Association, Readings jn the Theory of Income Distribution, Phila-
delphia, 1946, p. 499; and Joseph W. Conard, An introduction to the Theory of
interest, University of California, 1959, Part III.
2DavidMeiselman, The Term Structure of Interest Rates, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey, 1962, pp. 10 and 12.
A spot rate is a rate on funds for immediate delivery; it is today's rate for
money to be delivered today for a specified period of time. In contrast, a forward
rate is today's rate for money to be delivered in the future for a specified period
of time. This time period could be anything, a day, a year, or a decade.Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 339
and long-term securities, default risks aside, can be usefully viewed
as identical in all respects except maturity. It implies that the expected
value of the returns derived from holding long- and short-term secur-
ities for identical time periods are the same.
The word future should be emphasized in discussing the expectations
hypothesis, since it concerns the effects of expectations about future
short-term rates upon the current term structure of interest rates. To
illustrate with a simplified example: assume that two-year securities
yield 3 per cent and one-year securities 2 per cent. The forward rate on
one-year money one year hence, or the marginal cost of extending a
one-year term to maturity for an additional year, is 4 per cent; this is
arithmetic, not the expectations hypothesis. The expectations hypothesis,
as interpreted by Lutz and Meiselmañ, but not by Hicks, states that
the forward rates are unbiased estimates of future short-term rates.
For the preceding example, it implies that the market expects the rate
on one-year securities one year hence to be 4 per cent. Four per cent
is not only the forward rate—it is the expected one-year rate one year
hence; i.e.,it is what the market thinks the one-year rate will be one
year hence.
Conversely, assume a 2 per cent rate on two-year maturities and
a 3 per cent rate on one-year maturities. Then the yield on one-year
securities one year hence which will equalize the net yield from holding
two one-year securities successively with that of holding one two-year
security is1 per cent. This must follow if one accepts the view that
securities are alike in all respects except term to maturity.4
Existing Evidence
Macaulay
Macaulay was among the first to produce empirical evidence that re-
lated long-term rates to expectations of future short-term rates. Be-
fore the founding of the Federal Reserve System, there existed a pro-
nounced and well-known seasonal in the call money rate. The wide-
spread knowledge of the existence of this seasonal implied that time
money rates, which are loans from one to six months that are otherwise
similar to call money loans, should turn up before the seasonal rise in
'These calculations ignore compounding of interest and intermediate pay-
ments in the form of coupons.340 Essays on Interest Rates
call money rates. Macaulay found that time money rates did in fact
anticipate the seasonal rise in call money rates and concluded that this
constituted ". .evidenceof definite and relatively successful fore-
casting."5 Macaulay was unable to uncover additional evidence of
successful forecasting. He warned against concluding that forecasting
was not attempted. Macaulay's contention was that evidence of suc-
cessful forecasting is rare because successful forecasting is also rare.6
Hickman
W. Braddock Hickman, in a preliminary, unpublished, but nevertheless
widely cited and read, NBER manuscript prepared in 1942, reports the
results of his tests of the expectations hypothesis.7 Like Macaulay, he
sought evidence of successful forecasting; unlike Macaulay, he failed
to find it. He compared observed or actual yield curves with those
predicted one year or more ahead by the term structure of interest rates,
as interpreted by the Lutz-Meiselman variant of the expectations hy-
pothesis. For such a comparison, expected yield curves must be de-
termined at one point and actual yield curves at a later point of time.
If the expectations hypothesis isvalid, Hickman reasoned, then ex-
pected yield curves will be correlated with observed yield curves.
Hickman found that simply assuming that this year's yield curve
will be the same as next year's gave what he regarded as better pre-
dictions of subsequently observed yield curves than the expectations
hypothesis. This was one of the early uses of an inertia hypothesis as
a benchmark for evaluating the predictive content of a substantive
hypothesis. Hickman did not employ correlation analysis. If he did, as
shall be shown, his conclusion that inertia is the better predictor would
be more difficult if not impossible to sustain. In addition, he subjected
the expectations hypothesis to two additional tests. All of his tests are
based on the view that the validity of the expectations hypothesis
hinges upon accurate forecasts. Meiselman does not regard this finding
Frederick R. Macaulay, Movements of Interest Rates, p. 36. The reappear-
ance of a seasonal in the money market in recent years has made it possible to
reproduce Macaulay's experiment with a new body of data.
°Ibid., p. 33.
W. Braddock Hickman, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates: An Explora-
tory Analysis," NBER, 1942, mimeographed.Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 341
as relevant. "Anticipations may not be realized yet still determine the
structure of rates in the manner asserted by the theory."8
Culbertson
Culbertson's empirical research is similar to Hickman's; both ran tests
based on the assumption that forward rates are accurate predictions of
future spot rates. Culbertson examined the yields of short- and long-
term governments for identical periods of time. He argued that if the
expectations hypothesis is valid, then yields to investors ought to be
the same whether short- or long-term securities are held. (His calcula-
tions take into account both income streams and capital gains and
losses.) He found marked differences in returns for the same holding
periods. Since he found it difficult to believe that speculators would
operate in the government securities markets and predict as badly as
his results suggested, he rejected the expectations hypothesis.9
Walker
Walker's test of the expectations hypothesis also was based on the as-
sumption that the market could predict accurately. However, it was
more like Macaulay's work in this respect than that of Hickman and
Culbertson. Both he and Macaulay revealed the consistency between
the implications of accurate expectations and the expectations hypothe-
sis; both observed instances in which the expectations of the market
could be presumed to be accurate; and both found the behavior of the
market was consistent with the expectations hypothesis.1°
Meiselman, op cit., p. 12. Hickman also had some doubts about the relevance
of his test or any other test. The difficulties in conceiving of a means for testing
the expectations hypothesis led Conard to contend erroneously, as Meiselman's
work demonstrates, that only by assuming the market predicts accurately isit
possible "...tobuild a theory whose predictions can be meaningfully tested."
See Conard, op cit., p. 290.
°"..
.theexplanation of broad movements in the term structure of rates
must be sought principally in factors other than behavior governed by interest
rate expectations." See John M. Culbertson, "The Term Structure of Interest
Rates," Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1957, p. 502.
Meiselman, op. cit., p. 12, regards this and Hickman's work as tests of non-
existent implications of the expectations hypothesis.
10ChartsE. Walker, "Federal Reserve Policy and the Structure of Interest
Rates on Government Securities," Quarterly Journal of Economics, February
1954, p. 19.342 Essays on Interest Rates
Walker's work deals with governmental interest rate policy during
World War II. Around the beginning of that war, the Federal Reserve
System and the Treasury embarked upon a policy of stabilizing, through
open market operations and the maturity composition of new issues,
the existing levels of rates on government securities. At that time, the
yield curve was sharply rising; the bill rate was three-eighths of 1 per
cent, one-year securities yielded 1 per cent, and long-term securities 2.5
per cent. If the expectations hypothesis is correct, the prestabilization
term structure implied that future short-term rates were expected to be
higher than existing short-term rates. In contrast, the stabilization policy
implied that future short-term rates would be the same as current short-
term rates. When the financial community became convinced that the
monetary authorities could and would make this policy effective, it also
became convinced that existing long-term rates were inconsistent with
revised expectations of future short-term rates: long-term rates were
too high. Hence, there was a tremendous shift out of short- and into
long-term securities by the holders of governmental obligations. Such
a shift is implied by the expectations hypothesis, given the prewar term
structure and its wartime stabilization.1' This shift in large part con-
verted the stabilized yield on bills to a nominal rate similar to some
other wartime prices.
Walker's results, unlike Macaulay's findings, cannot be interpreted
as providing unambiguous support for the expectations hypothesis be-
cause they are also consistent with an implication of the liquidity pref-
erence hypothesis. Liquidity preference as a theory of the term struc-
ture of interest rates implies that the longer the term to maturity of a
security, the higher its yield. Yield differentials between long- and short-
term securities constitute equalizing differences that reflect differences in
risks of capital losses. The establishment of a ceiling on long-term
bond yields implies a floor or support price for their capital values. A
price support program for long-term bonds implies that much of the
If a rising yield curve exists, long-term securities yield more than short-term
because the market anticipates offsetting losses on capital account attributable to
holding long-term securities. The elimination of these anticipated capital losses
implies that the yield of long-term securities is truly greater than that of short-
term securities.
Conversely, a declining yield curve implies that future short-term rates will be
lower. Hence, the holders of long-term securities trade a lower income on current
account for anticipated capital gains. The stabilization of such a yield curve
means that these anticipated capital gains cannot be realized, hence, that the yield
of short-term securities is truly greater than that of long-term securities.Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 343
risk of capital loss is eliminated. Therefore, long maturities become
relatively more attractive investment media.
Although Walker's results do not discriminate between expectations
and liquidity preference, they do discriminate between expectations and
liquidity preference on the one hand and market segmentation on the
other. If the holdings of governments by the major institutions of the
financial community changed as much as Walker reports they did, this
constitutes evidence against the market segmentation hypothesis; if the
market segmentation hypothesis iscorrect, Walker should not have
observed a shift in the maturity distribution of governments by the
major institutions of the financial community.12
The expectations hypothesis has been rejected foritsunrealistic
assumptions, particularly the assumption that short- and long-term
securities of equivalent default risk can be treatedas perfect sub-
stitutes. Many practitionersinfinancialmarkets,committing the
fallacy of composition, reason that no one regards bills and long-
term bonds as alternatives because they observe that many institu-
tions specialize in a particular maturity spectrum. As long as some
rangesofmaturitiesareconsideredasalternatives by individual
participants in this market, and in the aggregate these ranges cover
the entire maturity spectrum, the market will act as though bills
and bonds are alternatives. Yet every participant in this market may
deal in a highly circumscribed maturity spectrum.
Mrs. Robinson has contended that the purchasers of a consol must
know the course of future interest rates for"...everyday from
today till Kingdom Come."13 Hickman and Luckett have enunciated,
less colorfully, essentially the same argument.14
Presumably the size of the bonus a promising high school or college
baseball player receives in exchange for his affiliation with a major
12Thisinterpretation of Walker's findings as well as the contention that his
results are consistent with liquidity preference does not appear in the original
paper. Walker regarded his evidence as supporting the Lutz variant of expecta-
tions. For another statement of what the market segmentation hypothesis is, see
Conard, op. cit., p. 304.
13SeeJoan Robinson, "The Rate of Interest," Economelrica, April 1951, p.
102.
14Dudley0. Luckett, "Professor Lutz and the Structure of Interest Rates,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1959, p. 131. Hawtrey also seems to
be a member of the school that rejects the expectations hypothesis because of
difficulties in predicting short-term rates. He argues that short- and long-term
rates are determined in completely segregated and independent markets. See
Ralph G. Hawtrey, "A Rejoinder," The Manchester School, October 1939, p. 156.344 Essays on Interest Rates
league club is a function of his expected performance as a ball player.
This interpretation, which is widely accepted, implies that the market
predicts the performance of a ball player over his entire career. In
order to properly calculate the size of these bonuses, the market must
predict batting averages, fielding performance, and, in the case of
pitchers, pitching effçctiveness. Emotional stability, which appears to
be irrelevant for determining future short-term rates, must also be
predicted for ball players, since many become emotionally unstable
in the face of severe competition and hence lose some of their economic
value.15
Meiselman
Meiselman is the first investigator to employ an operational test of
the expectations hypothesis that does not depend upon accurate fore-
sight for its validity. If a relationship exists between expectations and
the term structure of interest rates, then its existence can be detected
despite inaccurate predictions. The understanding by economists of
how expectations are formed and revised in the light of new informa-
.tion has improved enormously in recent years. Meiselman, by utilizing
this knowledge, was able to make the expectations hypothesis opera-
tional even when the market could not anticipate future rates of interest
correctly. He showed that expectations, whether or not they are correct,
nevertheless affect the term structure of rates. His results constitute
strikingevidencethattheexpectationshypothesishasempirical
validity.16
The expectations hypothesisimpliesthatthe term structureof
interest rates constitutes at one moment of time a set of predictions
of short-term rates at various moments of time in the future. For
15Theobjection to the expectations hypothesis for the lack of "realism" in its
assumptions has led to an attempt to find an alternative, more realistic set of
assumptions. See Burton G. Malkiel, "Expectations, Bond Prices, and the Term
Structure of Interest Rates," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1962, No. 2,
p.197. The author claims his model is"...incloser conformity with the
practices of bond investors who had always considered the Lutz theory chimeri-
cal." (See p. 218.) Conformity here should not be interpreted as predicting
better; there is no test of the predictive powers of the models in the Malkiel
paper. Conformity refers to the conformation of the assumptions of Malkiel's
model with descriptions of how bond investors behave.
Meiselman, op. cit., Chapter 2.Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 345
every instant of time, there exists a term structure or yield curve and
a set of implicit forward rates. These forward rates are, if the hypo-
thesisiscorrect, expected short-term rates.If two term structures
separated temporally are compared, the earlier contains predictions
of future short-term rates and the later the data, i.e., the realized or
actual short-term rates necessary for an evaluation of the accuracy
of these predictions. Recent work on expectations suggests that if• a
realized or actual short-term rate is above its predicted level, then
the predictions for other rates, yet to be realized,will be revised
upward. Conversely, if the actual rate is below the predicted, then
other predicted rates will be revised downward during the time interval
between observations.
To illustrate: Assume at T0, say January 1,1960, the following
relationships between yield and term to maturity are revealed by the
market:
Yields as a Function of Term to Maturity at T0




The expectations hypothesis, given this data at T0, implies that the
market expects future one-year rates to be higher than the current
one-year rate. Since the one-year rate is1 per cent and the two-year
rate 2 per cent, the forward rate on one-year money one year hence
must be 3. per cent for the returns on these alternatives to be equal.
Analogously, if the current two-year rate is 2 per cent and the three-
year rate 3 per cent, then the forward rate on one-year money two
years later must be high enough to compensate for the difference
between 2 and 3 per cent for two years. Therefore, a one-year rate
of 5 per cent is implied for two years hence.
Market Predictions at T0 of Expected One-Year Rates
Expected one-year rate for T1, the year beginning 1/1/61, is 3.0 per cent
T2 1/1/62,5.0
T3 1/1/63,7.0
Assume at T1, a year later, that the following relationships between
yield and term to maturity are revealed by the market:346 Essays on Interest Rates
Yields as a Function of Term to Maturity at T1
1-year governments yield 2.0 per cent
2 3.3
3 4.0
Clearly the one-year rate observed in the market at T, (2 per cent)
is less than it was expected to be a year ago (3 per cent). The differ-
ence between the anticipated one-year rate one year hence at T0 and
the realized one-year rate at T1 (both rates are for an identical moment
of time but are measured one year apart) is defined as the error. If
recently acquired knowledge on the formation of expectations is correct,
then forecasts of expected one-year rates for T2 and T3, i.e., for Janu-
ary 1, 1962, and 1963, will have been revised downward during the
year 1960, or between T0 and T1.
One can infer from the term structure of interest rates at T0 and T1
how much these estimates of future short-term rates have been revised.
Market Predictions at T0 and T1
Change in Forecast,
Expected One-Year or Magnitude of
Rate for One Year, Forecast Revision
Beginning in T0 (per cent)
January 1, 1962 (T2) 5.0 4.6 —0.4
January 1, 1963 (7'3) 7.0 5.4 —1.6
At T1 the expected one-year rates beginning at T2 and T3 are 4.6
and 5.4 per cent, respectively. The difference between 5.0 and 4.6
per cent measures the change in the forecast one-year rate for T2;
the difference between 7.0 and 5.4 measures the change in the fore-
cast one-year rate for T3. Hence, if the expectations hypothesis is
correct, then errors and forecast changes should be positively cor-
related.'7 Meiselman found that his error terms(i.e., the difference
between predicted and actual one-year rates) and his forecast revisions
were in fact positively correlated.
The between anticipated and unanticipated interest rate
changes is crucial for an understanding of how Meiselman tested the
expectations hypothesis. If forward rates a year apart are as depicted
by Chart 6-1, then the expectations hypothesis would imply that
there has been no change in the rates forecast. Yet the rates for one-,
7Meiselmandefines the error as the spot minus the forward; the revision of
the forecast is defined as the later forecast less the earlier.Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 347
CHART 6—1. Marginal Rates of Interest With Stable Expectations
A B
Percent
0 I I I
1961 1962 1963
two-,and three-year maturities must have changed during this year;
yield curves were not constant. Nevertheless, the expected one-year
rates for particular moments of time were unchanged. The observations
that are correlated, i.e., the error term and the forecast revision, refer
to interest rates for particular dates.'8
Meiselman correlated errorswith contemporaneous revisionsin
forecasts. For the example used, there are two forecast revisions, —0.4
and —1.6, that are correlated with the error, —1.0. The future spot
rates whose estimates were revised will be observed in the market as
spot, and not forward, rates one and two years after the spot rate in
the error term can be observed. For the data Meiselman employed,
the future spot rates whose estimates were revised will be observed in
the market as spot rates one through eight years after the spot rate
in his error term can be observed. In both the example and Meiselman's
work, forward, rates pertaining to subsequently observable one-year spot
rates for particular moments of calendar time were observed a year
apart. The difference between observations which pertain to the same
spot are forecast revisions.Since Meiselman observed his forward
and spot one-year rates yearly, he observed eight forward rate revisions
and one error term every year (with, of course, the exception of the
earliest year that his data encompasses). Meiselman produced eight
regressions relating forward rate revisions to errors observed simulta-
neously. He found significant relationships for all eight, with correlation
coefficients ranging from a low of .59toa high of .95. All eight re-
gression lines went through the origin, in the sense that the constant
terms of the regressions were insignificantly different from zero.
18Animplication of this distinctionisthe proposition that stock prices can
vary over time with no change in expectations of future earnings, if the market
expects earnings to fluctuate. Hence, insofar asinvestorsanticipatecyclical
changes in the profitability of enterprises, anticipated cyclical variations in stock
prices should exist.
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This led to the inference that forward rates are unbiased estimates
of future spot rates, which implies, when trends in interest rates are
ignored, that yield curves are on the average flat. Short- and long-term
rates will tend to be equal. If forward rates are biased upward, then
yield curves, again ignoring trends, are on the average positively sloped.
Hence, short-term rates will average less than long-term rates, and both,
on the average, will rise with term to maturity. Such differentials be-
tween different terms to maturity, usually referred to as liquidity premi-
ums, reflect the greater liquidity of short maturities.19 Meiselman argues
that the absence of a constant term in his regressions implies the absence
of liquidity premiums. If the constant term is zero, a forward rate that
is equal to the subsequently observed actual spot rate, i.e., a zero error
term, implies no forecast revision. If forecasts are not revised when the
error term is zero, then Meiselman infers that liquidity premiums are
absent. To show that this inference is incorrect, consider the following
formal statement of the hypothesis Meiselman tests:
— = —
Erepresent expected rates, R spot rates, F forward rates, and
L liquidity premiums. The pre-subscript represents a year of calendar
time. The post-subscript measures the moment a rate is either inferred
from the term structure or observed as an actual spot rate. The
forward and spot rates Meiselman considered were for one year only.
Hence, t+mEt is the expected one-year spot rate for the year t +m
that is inferred from the term structure of interest rates at moment
t. The expected one-year spot rate for the year I +mthat is inferred
from the term structure of interest rates at moment t —1is
t t —1is, for Meisel-
man's study, one year.
One cannot observe expected rates directly; the term structure of
interest rates reveals only forward rates. Whether or not E = F, or
E +L=F,must be established by empirical evidence. Suppose li-
quidity premiums exist and they increase monotonically at a decreasing
rate as a function of term to maturity. Then the longer the time
TheHicksian view of the term structure of interest rates implies that for-
ward rates are biased and high estimates of future short-term rates. He viewed
the "normal" yield curve as being positively sloped. See John R. Hicks, Value
and Capital, London, 1946, pp. 135—140. Lutz explicitly rejected the view that
liquidity premiums exist because he could observe short-term rates above corre-
sponding long-term rates and he regarded this as a contradiction of the liquidity
preference hypothesis. See Lutz, op. cii., p. 528.Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 349
interval between the moment a one-year forward rate is inferred from
a term structure and the moment it becomes a spot rate, the greater
the liquidity premium. Similarly, year-to-year changes in forward rates
for specific calendar years will increase as they get closer in time
to becoming spot rates. The largest increase will occur during the year
a forward rate becomes a spot rate.2°
If the forward rate, F, is equal to the expected rate, E, plus a
liquidity premium, L, then substituting in (1) yields
(e+mFe —e+mLc)— —t+mLg_i)= — —
Let—t+rnLt+ t+mLt_i = Then the restatement of Meiselman's
hypothesis becomes
—g+mFt_i= — + —
Letting = results in
—g+m1't-i — + a. (2)
This is the regression equation Meiselman computed. He found that
the observed constant was insignificantly different from zero. Hence, he
inferred thator —is also insignificantly different from zero.
A zero constant term is equally consistent with either =
=0 or => 0. Hence, this piece of evidence is inap-
propriate for establishing the validity of the proposition that forward
rates are unbiased estimates of expected spot rates;itis consistent
with the existence of liquidity premiums. The proposition that forward
rates are unbiased estimates of future spot rates remains untested.
Meiselman's own work, the work of Hickman, the time series of
short- and long-term governments for the past forty years, and some
new evidence presented here,allsupport the view that the term
structure of interest rates, as interpreted by the expectations hypothesis,
embodies biased and high estimates of future short-term rates. Meisel-
man used Durand's yield curves for high-grade corporates from 1900
through 1954 for his tests. For each of these years, Durand estimated
a yield curve. If an average is computed of the yields for each term
to maturity, i.e., an average of all fifty-five one-year maturities, two-
year maturities, etc., the composite yield curve which results reflects
average conditions for all fifty-five years. This curve is in fact positively
20Forthe purpose of determining whether or not forward rates are biased or
unbiased estimates of spot rates, the liquidity content of spot rates is irrelevant.
It is only the difference, if any, between the liquidity content of forward and spot
rates that matters.350 Essays on Interest Rates
sloped (see Chart 6-2). Since interest rates, if anything, were trending
down during these fifty-five years, forward rates must have been arith-
metically high estimates of spot rates.
If liquidity premiums exist, the frequency of high estimates ought
to be greater than that of low estimates and the average of the differ-
ences between estimated and actual rates ought to be positive. Hence,
Meiselman's error terms ought to have a significantly higher frequency
of minus than plus signs and their average ought to be negative. Tests
of these implications with the Wilcoxon two-sample and signed-rank
tests lead to their acceptance.21
The foregoing demonstrates that forward one-year rates were on
the average greater than actual one-year rates. It suggests that they
were also greater than expected one-year rates and that they systemati-
cally overstate what the market expects one-year rates to be. This
conclusion is based on an analysis of the inputs for Meiselman's
independent variable. What about the dependent variable,i.e.,the
forward-rate changes that are regarded by Meiselman as prediction
changes?Since forwardratechangesare thedifference between
observations, separated by a year, of forward rates that pertain to a
specific spot rate observable in the future, the first forward rate must
be inferred from data further out on a yield curve than the second.
Hence, if liquidity preference is operative(ifit produces positively
sloped yield curves), then the first forward rate ought to be, on the
average,greater than thesecond. Meiselman observed prediction
changes separated by one through eight years from the moment of
time relevant for the measurement of the error term. The first forward
rate is, on the average, larger than the second for all eight regressions.
It is hard to rationalize this observation as a chance event; the proba-
bility of drawing eight successive negative numbers from a population
in which negative and positive numbers are equally represented is less
than 1 per cent. On the whole, this evidence isconsistent with a
positively sloped yield curve that flattens out as term to maturity
increases;itis what one would expect to be derived from data
summarized by Chart 6-2.
Meiselman's changes in forward rates and error terms constitute
a measure of the marginal costs, more precisely the rate of change
SeeW. Allen Wallis and Harry V. Roberts, Statistics: A New Approach,
Glencoe, 1956, pp. 596—598. Significance levels of 6 and 2 per cent were produced
using one tail of the normal distribution. Of the fifty-four forward one-year rates,
thirty-five were high and nineteen were low.of yield with respect to term to maturity, of reducing term to maturity
by a year. The pecuniary values at the margin, as revealed by the
market, of liquidity changes attributable to changes in term to maturity
of one year are computed. They behave, roughly speaking, as one
would expect; the longer it takes for a forward rate to become a spot
rate, the greater the premium of forward over spot. With but two
exceptions out of a possible nine cases, liquidity premiums decrease
monotonically as term to maturity increases (see Table 6-1).
Hickman's data are consistent with Meiselman's findings. Predicted
yield curves for the years 1936 through 1942, with a year between
the time predicted and actual yield curves are observed, were all high.
Even more interesting, and this is consistent with Meiselman's data,
Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 351
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TABLE 6-1. Meiseirnan's Error Term and Forecast Revisions
Years Until Second
Observation Becomes a
One-Year Spot Rate Per Cent
Mean error terma 0 —.143








NOTE: These data were obtained through personal communication with Meiselman.
aMean of differences between one-year forward and spot rates.
bMean change in one-year forward rates as term to maturity decreases by one year.
Hickman's results show that the longer the interval between predicted
and observed or actual yield curves, the greater 'the bias in the esti-
mates.22 This empirical finding is an implication of a positively sloped
yield curve when trends in rates are absent.
The data on yields of governments for the nine most recent business
cycles, a period of roughly forty years, clearly indicate that the average
yields of short-term governments are less than long-term governments.
All nine cycles, without exception, conform tothis generalization.
These data constitute additional evidence that the term structure of
rates,as interpreted by the expectations hypothesis,yields biased
estimates of future short-term rates. If forward rates are not expected
rates, but expected rates plus a liquidity premium, one should expect
these time series to show that yields of short-term governments are
usually less than long-term governments. Since Meiselman and Hick-
man worked with Durand's data,, which reflect the yields of high-grade
corporates, these data on the relative yields of short- and long-term
governments for these nine cycles constitute independent evidence of
the existence of bias in the predictions of the expectations hypothesis.
Unfortunately, this evidence is not unexceptionable. The fifty-five
yearly observations of Durand, which Meiselman used, have a down-
22Thereare twenty-eight predictions, all too high.Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 353
ward trend. In 1900, Durand's basic thirty-year rate was 3.30 per cent;
in. 1954,it was 3.00 per cent.Ifdeclining short-term ratesare
unanticipated, the predicted rates of the expectations hypothesis will
exceed actual rates. From 1935 through 1942, the downward trend
is still greater; the thirty-year basic rate fell from 3.50 to 2.65. Hence,
if the long-term downward trend in rates has been unanticipated by
the market, the relationship between the yields of short- and long-term
governments may be a consequence of forecasting errors.23
Meiselman, like Walker, produced evidence relevant for evaluating
the validity of the market segmentation hypothesis; unlike Walker,
Meiselman points out the relevance of his work for this hypothesis.
•.thesystematic behavior of the yield curve would appear to
contradict the widely held view that the market for debt claims is
'segmented'or'compartmentalized'bymaturityandthatrates
applicable to specific maturity segments can best be analyzed by rather
traditionalpartial equilibrium supply and demand analysis where
transactors act on the basis of preference for specific maturities.
•
Thecorrelation between forward rate revisions and error terms demon-
strates that changes in the yields of one- and two-year securities are
related to changes in yields of maturities up to nine and ten years.
Consequently,at least for this maturity range, the market is not
segmented enough to invalidate this test of the expectations hypothesis.
New Evidence
Confining tests of the expectations hypothesis to circumstances for
which expectations can be presumed to be accurate has produced
only fragmentary evidence. Expectations can be presumed to be
accurateonly under veryspecialcircumstances.Hence, forward
rates can equal expected spot rates and yet differ from realized spot
rates. But even this limited approach has not been fully exploited.
clearly, in a world in which spot rates are positive, and this would
surely encompass the two most recent decades, one could assume
thatthe market never expects negativespot rates.Therefore,if
23Hickmanfound that a simple projection of the previous year's yield curve
produced numerically closer predictions than the expectations hypothesis, which
is consistent with the foregoing interpretation. His finding isalso, of course,
consistent with an upward bias in the predictions of the expectations hypothesis.
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negative forward rates were observed, this would constitute evidence
against the expectations hypothesis. Conversely, if negative forward
rates were not observed, this would be evidence for the hypothesis.
The behavior of the term structure of bill yields during September
1960 contradictsthe expectationshypothesis.Inthat month the
forward rate on one-week money, inferred from the term structure of
billyields with maturities on December 8th and 15th, was often
negative.25
For nine of the twenty-one trading days in September 1960, negative
forward rates for one-week money could be observed. To restate the
foregoing, on these nine dates in September 1960 (and this same
phenomenon could be observed in September 1959) there existed some
bills whose asked prices were higher than the asked prices for bills
with one week less to maturity. Since it is unreasonable to argue that
the market expected the spot rate for one-week bills on September
8th, or any other week since the end of World War II, to be negative,
it follows that forward rates are not expected spot rates.
Critics have rejected the expectations hypothesis because the pre-
dictions of future short-term rates implied by the theory differed from
subsequently observed actual rates. Meiselman argues that these critics
have rejected the hypothesis for the wrong reasons. His position, that
expectations need not be correct to determine the term structure of
interest rates, is, of course, valid. Yet, given free entry and competition
in securities markets, should not one expect to find a relationship
between expectations as inferred from the term structure of interest
rates and subsequently observed actual rates? It is of course unreason-
able to expect expectations or predictions of future short-term rates
to be absolutely accurate. New information coming to the market after
a prediction is made will lead to prediction revisions and less than
perfect forecasts. Yet new information should not lead to biases in the
estimates; a mean bias should not be present. Hence, the average
difference between predicted and actual rates ought to be insignificantly
different from zero. The absence or presence of a mean bias in the
relationship constitutes. a test of whether or not forward rates are
expected rates. Similarly, for very short intervals between the inference
of predictions and the observation of actual short-term rates, there
should be some observable advantage for the expectations hypothesis
The asked prices reported on the quote sheets of C. J. Devine were the
source of price data. Salomon Bros. & Hutzler quote sheets contained data that
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over some form of inertia as a predictor of future short-
rates. If not, why should the market waste its time and energy, which
are scarce resources, in trying to predict future short-term rates?2°
To control for trends in rates, and to measure forward and actual
rates uninfluenced by capital gain considerations, the forward and
actual yields of Treasury bills were examined from the beginning of
1959 through March 1962. All of the forward rates implicit in the
term structure of interest rates during that time for two-, four-, six-,
eight-, nine-, and thirteen-week bill rates were computed and com-
pared with actual yields. The time period under investigation began
and ended with the 91-day bill rate at the same level, approximately
2.75 per cent, although it rose sharply to 4.50 per cent and fell to
2.25 before it came back to its original level. The results of this inves-
tigation are tabulated in Table 6-2.
Theseresults,along withtheevidencealreadycited,strongly
support the belief that forward rates are biased and high estimates
of future short-term rates. Hence, they are not the predictions of the
market. In addition, these findings support the common belief that
there exists a preference for short-term over long-term securities in
the market. This preference produces a yield differential that consti-
tutes an equalizing difference. The greater pecuniary yield of long-term
securities represents compensation for the nonpecuniary advantages
associated with holding short-term securities.
These findings also suggest that the futures market for money may
be unlike other futures markets. Generally, one finds that forward
prices are below corresponding spot prices when spot prices are rising
and above them when spot prices are falling. For the futures market
for money, however, forward rates in the Treasury bill market are
typically above spot rates even when the latter are rising. During an
upswing, the extent to which this occurs narrows, and some reversals,
i.e.,spot rates in excess of forward rates,occur. However, these
reversals are surprisingly infrequent.
On theoretical grounds, one should expect liquidity premiums to
vary with the level of interest rates. Treasury bills, like other securities,
can be viewed as providing two streams of income: one is a pecuniary
20Meiselmanwent too far in dismissing the work of Hickman and Culbertson.
The expectations hypothesis, as he and Lutz interpreted it, does imply that there
ought to be equality in the yields of short- and long-term rates in the absence
of trends. If there is not, either the people operating in this market are doing
an unbelievably bad job or this constitutes evidence against the Meiselman ver-
sion of the expectations hypothesis.356 Essays on InterestRates













No. of observations 124 143 146 137 113 125
Frequency of high
predictions 93 132 135 120 91 119
Average size of
errors (per cent) .199 .567 .599 .444 .455 .669
Average actual rates
(per cent) 2.34 2.39 2.54 2.67 2.79 2.91
NOTE: Bills with precisely 182 and 91 days to maturity' were used to compute
the forward 91-day rate. Ninety-one days after this computation, the spot 91-day rate
was observed and compared with the forward rate. Similarly, bills with 126, 112, 84,
63, 56, 42, 28, and 14 days to maturity were used to compute forward rates and to
measure spot rates.
Bid and asked prices, obtained from government bond dealers, were averaged to
obtain the prices used. The daily quote sheets of Salomon Bros. & Hutzler, C. J.
Devine & Co., were the sources of bid and asked prices. These daily price reports
quote bid and asked prices of bills for specified days to maturity from the time
payment is received.
Forward 91-day rates were computed by subtracting the current 91-day rate from
twice the current 182-day rate. This method of computing forward rates increases the
difficultiesof detecting an upward biasintheestimatesof the expectations
hypothesis. It understates forward relative to spot rates. Indeed, if the estimates of
the expectations hypothesis were unbiased, this computing procedure would show a
downward bias. Bill yields are bankers discount yields, and equal discount yields for
different maturities are not comparable. For example, a 4 per cent discount yield on a
90-day bill implies a yield on a 360-day basis of 4.04 per cent. In contrast, a 4 per
cent discount yield on a 180-day bill implies a yield of 4.08 on a 360-day basis. In
general,the longer the term to maturity of a bill,the more its discount yield
understates its bond equivalent yield. Hence, the procedure followed produces lower
estimates of forward rates than would be produced by a correct computation.
yield measured by interest rates; the other is a nonpecuniary yield as
a money substitute. The average difference in 28- and 56-day bill
yields can be viewed as an equalizing difference that reflectsthe
greater value of the former as a money substitute. Economics custom-
arily think of a rise in interest rates as implying an increase in the
cost of holding money. By parity of reasoning, an increase in interest
rates should also imply an increase in the cost of holding money
substitutes. Since 28-day bills are better money substitutes than 56-day
bills, a rise in interest rates implies that the opportunity costs of holding
the former should rise relative to that of holding the latter. For thisCyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 357
condition to be satisfied, yields of 56-day bills must rise relative to
those of 28-day bills. Such a rise implies an increase in liquidity
premiums, i.e., an increase in the spread between forward and actual
28-day rates. This reasoning is consistent with the results obtained
for the range of bill maturities studied; the opportunity costs of holding
any specified maturity, instead of a longer and hence lessliquid
maturity, increases as interest rates rise. Conversely, these opportunity
costs decrease when ratesfall. Within the range of bill maturities
observed, and contrary to what is true for the yield curve as a whole,
yield curves are steepest when rates are high and flattest when rates
are low.
If the spread between 28- and 56-day bills increases with a rise in
rates, and if liquidity premiums increase, then the premium of forward
over spot money should also increase. This implies that what Meiselman
and Hickman erroneously regarded as error terms, the difference be-
tween forward and subsequently observed spot rates,should be a
positive function of the current level of spot rates. To determine
whether or not this inference is correct, the difference between forward
and subsequently observed 28-day spot rates was regressed on current
28-day spot rates. This is equivalent to regressing liquidity premiums
plus or minus a forecasting error on current 28-day rates.These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that liquidity premiums rise
with the level of spot rates. The premium of forward over spot 28-day
rates increases by one basis point for every increase of about five basis
points in the spot rate.
The foregoing conclusion was derived from 137 monthly observa-
tions during the three business, cycles from October 1949 through
February 1961. They are supported by the results obtained from a
regression using 138 weekly observations of 91- and 182-day bills
from January 1959 through February 1961. For the latter test, the
regression coefficient was about twice the former. A rise of about two
and a half basis points in the 91-day bill rate is associated with a rise
of about one basis point in the premium of forward over spot 91-day
rates.27
27Forthe 91-day bills, the weekly observations cover a period when there were
182- and 91-day bills outstanding simultaneously. The regression coefficient was
.43 with a standard error of .05.
For the 28-day bills, observations were obtained once a month. Typically, more
than one observation could have been used in any month. The observation358 Essays on Interest Rates
Since both interest rates and business conditions vary with the
cycle,thefinding thatliquidity premiums rise withinterestrates
raises the question, are liquidity premiums a function of the level
of interest rates or of the stage of the business cycle? In order to
investigate this question, forward and actual 28-day bill rates were
computed monthly from the term structure56- and 28-day bills
for the three latest complete business cycles. During these three cycles,
there was an upward trend in interest rates. Therefore,if liquidity
premiums vary with the level of rates, it should be possible to observe
that they risesecularly. The regression of the difference between
predicted and actual 28-day rates on time for these three cycles does
indicate an upward trend. Hence, liquidity premiums are positively
related to the level of interest rates.28
The existence of liquidity premiums implies that the expectations
hypothesis yields biased and high estimates of future short-term rates.
It does not rtveal in any direct way whether or not the market has
any power to correctly anticipate subsequently observed spot rates.
If liquidity premiums are held constant, if expected and not forward
rates are observed, does a significant relationship exist between these
expected rates and subsequently observed spot rates?
Forward rates for specific periods of calendar time and subsequently
observed spot rates for the same periods were subjected to correlation
analysis. This corrects, in a very crude way, for bias in the estimates
of future spot rates attributable to liquidity premiums. Forward rates,
which can be regardedas market predictions when adjustedfor
liquidity premiums, were inferred from the term structure of 182- and
91-day bill rates. (These rates were computed using an average of bid
and asked prices adjusted for bankers discount.)
The results of thistest indicate that the expectations hypothesis
chosen was the one closest to the middle of the month. The regression coefficient
was .22 with a standard error of .03.
The effects of bankers discount were eliminated from these data.
The association of a rise in liquidity premiums with a rise in the level of rates
can also be shown by regressing the difference between forward and subsequently
observed spot rates upon their sum.
The validity of these tests depends upon the absence of positive correlation
between forecasting errors and spot rates. Unfortunately itis difficult to disen-
tangle forecasting errors from liquidity premiums.
28Of137 predictions of the Lutz variant of the expectations hypothesis, 121
were high, five low, and eleven were correct. The effects of bankers discount were
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definitely does have predictive content. For 138 predictions of 91-day
bill rates from the beginning of 1959 through the first quarter of 1962,
the expectations hypothesis explained 58 per cent of the observed
variation. The question remains whether an inertia hypothesis could
do equally well or better. Perhaps the observed correlation could be
attributable to serial correlation in the data.
To determine whether or not the results obtained should be imputed
to correct expectations, two variants of an "inertia hypothesis" were
considered. One "predicted" 91-day billrates 91days hence by
assuming no change. The other extrapolated into the future the differ-
ence between current 91-day rates and those 91 days ago.
The correlations for both variants of the inertia hypothesis tested
were the same; each explained 48 per cent of the observed variation.
The expectations hypothesis explained approximately 20 per cent
more of the observed variation. During most of the period of obser-
vation, from about the middle of 1959 through the middle of 1960,
there was a sharp rise and fall in rates. For the remainder of the
period, interest rates were roughly stable. If the two hypotheses are
compared for the period when rates were highly unstable (this reduces
the number of observations to fifty), then expectations explain 48
per cent of the observed variations, whereas the variants of inertia
each explain 30 per cent. The comparative advantage of the theory
was stronger, as one would expect, when interest rates were unstable.
Isthe observed difference between these correlationcoefficients
significant? Could it have occurred as a result of chance? To answer
this question, forward and current spot rates were correlated with
subsequently observed spot rates and the partial correlation coefficients
were computed. The addition of current spot rates increased the
fraction of the observed variation explained from 58 to 59 per cent.
The partial regression coefficient for expectations was significant and
positive (the partial regression coefficient was .86, with a standard
error of .14). In contrast, the partial regression coefficient for inertia
was negative and also significant (the regression coefficient was —.31,
with a standard error of .18).
These results indicate clearly that the expectations hypothesis does
have predictive content that cannot be attributed to inertia. However,
the negative coefficient for inertia requires explanation. The hypothesis
presented here views the forward rate as a function of expected spot
rates plus a liquidity premium. But liquidity premiums are a function
of the level of spot rates: when current spot rates are high, the360 Essays on Interest Rates
premium over spot that is reflected in the forward rate is also high,
and vice versa. Hence, the larger the spot rate, the larger the number
that ought to be deducted from forward rates to obtain the expected
rates of the, market. Therefore, the negative coefficient which is ob-
served is consistent with the view that liquidity premiums exist and
vary directly with the level, of interest rates, more specifically with
spot rates.
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The data used to evaluate the predictive content of the expectations
hypothesis are reproduced in Chart 6-3. The thick line depicts actual
91-day rates. The thin lines indicate forward rates adjusted and un-
adjusted for liquidity premiums. The point of origin of the thin lines
at the thick line represents the moment a forward rate is inferred;
the terminal point of the thin line measures the magnitude of the
forward rate at the moment when the actual 91-day rate corresponding
tothisforward rate can be observed.Liquidity premiums were
measured using the regression equation obtained by regressing the
difference between forward and realized 91-day rates on current spot
rates. These results' suggest that within the range of maturities en-
compassed by Treasurybills,expectations do influencethe term
structure of interest rates, and the market forecasts future spot rates
with some degree of accuracy. However, to obtain the expectations of
the market, liquidity premiums must be deducted from forward rates.2°
Thefact that forward rates are usually higher than actual spot rates may
have led Hickman to abandon the search .for a relationship between them. An
inertia hypothesis could produce numerically closer predictions to spot rates than
the expectations hypothesis, yet the latter could produce stronger correlations.
Itis the strength of the correlations,if one accepts the view that liquidity
premiums exist,thatisrelevant for evaluating thesealternatives. Insofar as
liquidity premiums are a constant or linear function of forward rates, they do
not influence the correlation of forward with spot rates. For the two sets of seven
pairs of observations in Hickman's study, representing one-year forecasts, the
correlation coefficient for expectations was .725; for inertia, .721. When bothCyclical Behavior 0/the Term Structure 361
CHART 6—3. Market Expectations of Future 91-Day Bill Rates
Forwardrates
Forward rates adjusted for liquidity premiums
Spot rates
A.First Observations of Continuous Four-Week Periods
variables were included in a multiple correlation, neither had a significant par-
tial correlation coefficient. Hence, no basis is provided by-correlation analysis for
arguing that one or the other variable explained the observed variation. If one
plots forward rates and the variant of inertia Hickman employed, there is almost
a constant difference between them.
Per cent
6
B.Second Observations of Continuous Four-Week Periods Per cent
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CHART 6—3 (concluded)
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Thus far,this analysis does not reveal how stable the liquidity
preference functionis.Isthe relationship between spot rates and
liquidity premiums stable enough to permit one •to estimate 'liquidity
premiums for one business cycle and use these estimates to uncover
successfully the expectations of the market,as distinguished fromCyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 363
forward rates, for a second cycle? To answer this question, the regres-
sion of the difference between forward and subsequently observed
28-day spot rates upon current 28-day spot rates, for the two cycles
from October 1949 through April 1958, was used to estimate liquidity
premiums for the following cycle. Then inertia and expectations were
compared as a means of forecasting subsequently observed spot rates.
Expectations was definitely the better predictor. The standard error of
estimate was .50 for inertia against .38 for expectations. The partial
regression coefficient for inertia was —.07; for expectations, it was .75.
The standard error of the regression coefficient was .19 for inertia
and .16 for expectations. Multiple correlation analysis, using forward
rates adjusted for liquidity premiums, yields results almost identical
with those obtained with unadjusted forward rates.3°
These results suggested that the data Meiselman employed, which
were compiled by Durand, should be reexamined to see if forward
rates do predict subsequently observed spot rates. Hence, forward
and current spot rates were considered as independent variables and
subsequently observed spot rates as the dependent variable in a multi-
ple regression equation. This involves using the same data Meiselman
used to compute what he regards as an error term. No evidence of
successful forecasting was detected; inertia appeared to be the better
independent variable.
To utilize more recent data that are qualitatively more comparable
to the data Meiselman utilized, the experiment performed with forward
and spot three-month Treasurybills was repeated using monthly
forward and spot one-year governments for 1958 through 1961. One-
and two-year rates were read offthe fixed maturity yield curve
published monthly in the Treasury Bulletin.31 Again, forward and
current spot rates were treated as independent variables and subse-
quently observed spot rates as the dependent variable. The result is
consistent with that using three- and six-month bills and reinforces
the view that the market has some power to forecast successfully.
However, taken by itselfit does not constitute quite as convincing
evidence of the existence of successful forecasting. This is what one
80Forthe three cycles, 1949 to 1961, the simple correlation coefficients indi-
cated that expectations explained 88 per cent of the observed variation whereas
inertia, i.e., extrapolating no change, explained 82 per cent.
Iam indebted to H. Irving Forman of the National Bureau staff for these
measurements.364 Essays on Interest Rates
would it is harder to forecast a year into the future than it is
to forecast for three months.
If the rationalization of the statistical findings using three- and
six-month bills is correct, then forward rates should have a positive
coefficient and current one-year rates a negative one. One should also
expect to find that the partial correlation coefficient for expectations
would be smaller in the case of one- and two-year Treasury securities
than it was for three- and six-month bills.
These anticipations are in general borne out. The sign of the re-
gression coefficient for one-year spot rates is negative. For three- and
six-month bills, this regression coefficient is 75percent greater than
its standard error; for one- and two-year governments, it is a third
larger than its standard error. For three- and six-month bills, the
regression coefficient for forward ratesis positive and six times its
standard error; in the case of one- and two-year governments, it is
positive but only nine-tenths its standard error.
Possibly the most convincing evidence that the market can forecast,
with modest accuracy, one-year spot rates one year into the future
was obtained through the following experiment. Liquidity premiums
embodied in one-year forward rates for the 1958—61 cycle were esti-
mated from an equation derived from the difference between forward
and subsequently observed spot rates regressed on current one-year
rates for the 1954—58 cycle. The expected rates of the market for
the 1958—61 cycle were then obtained by subtracting the estimated
liquidity premiums from forward rates. The mean square errors in the
implicit forecasts of the market, i.e., the difference between forward
rates less liquidity premiums and subsequently observed spot rates
were compared with those generated by assuming next year's one-year
spot rates will be identical with current rates. Although neither inde-
pendent variable appeared in some absolute sense to yield very good
forecasts,itis clear that expectations was significantly better as an
independent variable than inertia. For thirty-five monthly observations,
the mean square error was 2.09 for inertia, .91 for expectations. The
elimination of liquidity premiums contributed importantly to this reduc-
tion in error. Without such adjustment, the mean square error of the
forward rates was 1.91, only slightly less than that for inertia. These
results show that if one is predicting one-year rates one year hence,
and the current one-year rate is known, adding the two-year rate to
one's knowledge constitutes a valuable piece of information.
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1958 to 1961 are reproduced as Chart 6-4. These data, as well as the
data for forward and spot three-month bills, suggest that the market
can detect spot rates that are abnormally high or low. All of the for-
ward rates are biased estimates. However, if one examines the slopes
CHART 6—4. Forward and Spot One-Year Rates on Government Securities
SouRcE: Derived from Treasury yield curves, using one- and two-year rates.
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of the lines connecting current spot rates with forward rates for one
year into the future, these lines appear flattest when current spot rates
are highest. Hence, if the market can abstract from liquidity premiums
(which produce the bias) then it appears that the market can forecast.
That is, when rates are high, the market expects them to fall, and
conversely, as the adjusted forward rates in the lower part of the
chart suggest. This is consistent with the view that the market has
some notion of what constitutes a normal rate of interest.
What causesthe observed difference between theresultsusing
Durand's data on corporates and the recent data on one- and two-
year governments? The evidenceprovidesthebasisforhighly
speculative answers at best. Durand's data encompass fifty-five years
and are yearly observations; the data on governments encompass
five years and are monthly observations. Possibly the market cannot
distinguish betwen cyclically and secularly high and low rates of
interest. If the market could anticipate cyclical changes better than
secular changes, there would be an observed difference in forecasting
accuracy over one cycle as compared with many cycles. When spot
rates are high cyclically, their subsequent change isquite different
from that when they are high secularly. If the forecasts of the market
are the same in either case, studies of the accuracy of forecasts will
lead to different results depending upon the time period under inves-
tigation.
Another avenue for explaining secular and cyclical differencesis
the study of the stability of liquidity premiums over time. Before the
1930's, judging by Durand's data,liquidity premiums were much
smaller or possibly nonexistent. There seems to have been a structural
change in the economy in this respect since the early 1930's. Possibly
this can be attributed to the abolition of interest on demand deposits,
or perhaps to a change in attitude toward risk that led to changes in
liquidity premiums. In any case, instability of liquidity premiums could
account for the observed difference in the secular and cyclical correla-
tions of forward and one-year spot rates.
Still another avenue for explaining these findings is data limitations.
Durand did not use a criterion such as least squares for his curve
fitting. He fitted only yield curves that do not have maximums or
minimums. When his yield curves were not flat throughout, they either
increased or decreased monotonically with term to maturity and then
flattened out. By definition, Durand could not observe a yield curve
with any other shape. He offers no explanation for this self-imposed
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Inthe postwar period, when short-term rates have been above long-
term rates, yield curves have been hump shaped. These curves at first
rise with term to maturity, reach a maximum, and then fall and finally
flatten out. It is difficult to believe that this was not also true during
some of the fifty-five years encompassed by Durand's data.If one
examines both the data and the curves fitted, it is clear that humped
yield curves could just as correctly have been fitted some of the time.
Since this was not done, one- and two-year rates derived from Durand's
curves are probably high estimates of true one- and two-year rates,
and are high relative to longer maturities.
If one examines the yield curves Durand fitted to data in the 1920's,
yield curves for governments and corporates have opposite slopes for
three of these years. Indeed, the data on governments presented above
show short-term governments yielding, on average, less than long-term
governments in the 1920's. Durand's findings on corporates indicate
just the opposite.
Another difficulty, ignored by both Hickman and Meiselman,is
the fact that Durand's yield curves are drawn for coupon bonds.
Hence, the Hicksian formula for internal rates of return or yield to
maturity, which implicitly assumes the absence of coupons,isin-
appropriate for computing forward rates. To compute forward rates
correctly, both coupons and yields to maturity, or internal rates of
return, must be known.
If one accepts the view that yield curves were, on average, positively
sloped during the fifty-five years Durand observed, then. coupon rates
for bonds with one or two years to maturity must have, on average,
exceeded internal rates of return. If coupons exceed internal rates of
return, then it can be shown that the Hicksian formula underestimates
forwardrates.However,the measurement errorswhich can be
attributed to ignoring coupons seem to be small compared to those
attributableto uncertainties regarding the shape of Durand's yield
curves. Using coupons of 6 per cent, errors in computing forward rates
seem to be on the order of two or three basis points.
The figures on billrates collected provide new data to repeat
Meiselman's experiments. The resultsoftestsof the expectations
hypothesis using Treasury bills are tabulated in Table 6-3. Treasury
bills with terms to maturity of less than six months are the source
of price data.
Sincethesecorrelationsareallunambiguouslysignificant,they
provide additional support for Meiselman's view that a relationship
between expectations and the term structure of interest rates exists.368 Essays on Interest Rates







1.Error in forecast of two-week rates with
changes in expected two-week rates two
weeks hence .37 .40
2.Error in forecast of two-week rates with
changes in expected two-week rates eleven
weeks hence .36 .26
3.Error in forecast of four-week rates
with changes in expected four-week
rates twelve weeks hence .21 .27
4.Error in forecast of six-week rates
with changes in expected six-week rates
eighteen weeks hence .59 .62
5.Error in forecast of eight-week rates
..with changes in expected eight-week
rates sixteen weeks hence .85 .59
NOTE: The existence of liquidity premiums implies that the errors as defined by
Meiselman are typically larger than the true errors the market committed. The true
errors are the differences between forward rates minus liquidity premiums and spot
rates; the true forecast revisions are the observed revisions net of liquidity differences.
SOURCE:Line 1: Correlation of changes in predicted two-week bill rates with
forecasting errors implied by the expectations hypothesis, i.e., with the difference
between predicted and actual two-week rates. The error terms were obtained by
comparing predictions implied by four- and two-week bill rates with actual two-week
bill rates two weeks later. The prediction changes were obtained from the difference
between the predicted two-week rate four weeks hence and then, two weeks later,
two weeks into the future. The first prediction was obtained through the use of six-
and four-week bills; the second was measured through the use of four- and two-week
bills.
Line 2: Correlation of changes in predicted two-week bill rates as inferred from
eleven- and bills and, two weeks later, from nine- and seven-week bills with
the difference between predicted and actual two-week rates. The independent variables
for this and the test described in line 1 are identical.
Line 3: Correlation of changes in predicted four-week bill rates with the pre-
diction errors implied by the expectations hypothesis. The independent variable is the
(continued)Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 369
NOTES TO TABLE 6-3 (concluded)
difference between predictions implied by eight- and four-week bifi rates and, four
weeks later, actual four-week bill rates. The dependent variable, the prediction change,
is the difference between the predicted four-week rate implied by the sixteen- and
twelve-week bill rates and, four weeks later, the predicted four-week rate implied by
the twelve- and eight-week bill rates.
Line 4: Correlation of changes in predicted six-week bill rates with prediction
errors. The independent variable is the difference between predictions implied by
twelve- and six-week bill rates and, six weeks later, actual six-week bill rates. The
dependent variable, the prediction change, is the difference between the predicted
six-week rate implied by the twenty-four- and eighteen-week rates and, six weeks
later, the predicted six-week rate implied by the eighteen- and twelve-week bill rates.
Line 5: Correlation of changes in predicted eight-week bill rates with prediction
errors. The independent variableisthe difference between predictions implied by
sixteen- and eight-week bifi rates and, eight weeks later, actual eight-week bill rates.
The dependent variable, the prediction change, is the difference between the predicted
eight-week rate implied by the twenty-four- and sixteen-week rates and, eight weeks
later, the predicted eight-week rate implied by the sixteen- and eight-week rates. This
may be illustrated by the following sample calculation. On November 28, 1961, the
sixteen-week rate was 2.61, and the eight-week rate 2.51. The expectations hypothesis
implies that the eight-week rate eight weeks hence, on January 23, 1962, is expected
to be 2.71. This is twice the sixteen-week rate less the eight-week rate. The actual
eight-week rate on January 23, 1962, eight weeks after November 28, was 2.61.
Hence, the error is —.10. The first prediction in the data from which line 5 was
derived was inferred from the twenty-four- and sixteen-week rates on November 28,
1961. These were 2.72 and 2.61, respectively. Hence, the predicted rate for March 20,
1962, which is three times the twenty-four week rate less twice the sixteen-week rate,
is 2.94. Eight weeks later, on January 23, 1962, the sixteen-week rate was 2.72, and
the eight-week rate was 2.61. Hence, the predicted eight-week rate for March 20,
1962, was 2.83, and the prediction change —.11.
His major conclusion—that thereisvalidityintheexpectations
hypothesis—is sound,despitehisfailuretoisolateunanticipated
changes in interest rates and to recognize that forward rates were
not expected rates. What about the data Meiselman used? How are
the liquidity premiums related to the level of rates for Durand's data?
The regression of the difference between forward and subsequently
observed spot one-year rates against current one-year rates reveals
little variation in the "error" with the level of spot rates. The regression
coefficient is .09 with the standard error of .06, and only about 4 per
cent of the variation is explained. In contrast, for the same regression
using forward and spot one-year governments for the 1958—61 cycle,
the regression coefficient is one, with a standard error of .10, and 70370 Essays on Interest Rates
per cent of the variation is explained. Clearly the difference between
forward and spot rates for the government data appears to be much
more sensitive to variations in spot rates than it is for Durand's data.
The reappearance of a seasonal in the money market in recent
years implies that it is possible to repeat Macaulay's experiment with
a new body of data. If the expectations hypothesis is correct, seasonal
adjustment factors ought to vary systematically with term to maturity.
More specifically, just as the time money rates "anticipated" seasonal
changes in call money rates, changes in, say, sixty-day seasonal adjust-
ment factors ought to "anticipate" changes in thirty-day factors. Hence,
it should be possible to construct a set of seasonal adjustment factors
for sixty-day ratesifthe factors for thirty-dayratesare known;
knowledge of seasonal adjustment factors for thirty-day bills implies
knowledge of these factors for bills of longer maturity.
To test this hypothesis, weekly moving seasonal adjustment factors
were computed for twenty-seven- and fifty-five-daybillsfor1959,
1960, and 1961, using bid prices unadjusted for bankers discount. If
the expectations hypothesis is correct, a set of seasonal adjustment
factorsforfifty-five-daybillsconstructed out of twenty-seven-day
factors ought to be more strongly correlated with actual fifty-five-
day factors than just twenty-seven-day factors alone. For every week,
a simple average of twenty-seven-day factors for that week and for
four weeks in the future was computed. This should be, according
to the expectations hypothesis, a fifty-five-day seasonal. The correlation
of this set of theoretical seasonal adjustments with actual fifty-five-day
adjustment factors was stronger than the correlation between twenty-
seven- and fifty-five-day factors. Converse results ought to hold for a
fifty-five-day seasonal adjustment constructed out of twenty-seven-day
factors, if the adjustment factors are obtained by averaging the current
twenty-seven-day seasonal with that of four weeks in the past. This
seasonal, when correlatedwiththefifty-five-dayseasonaldirectly
computed, ought to exhibit less correlation than exists for the relation-
ship between twenty-seven- and fifty-five-day factors. Hence, the rank
ordering of correlationsalone,quiteapart from thequestion of
whether or not there is a significant difference between the correlations,
constitutes evidence, that the market anticipates seasonal movements
in rates. These findings are summarized in Table 6-4.
The Durand data and the data collected for this study provide a
means for discriminating between expectations and liquiditypref-
erence on the one hand and market segmentation on the other. TheCyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 371
























market segmentation hypothesis implies that differences in maturity
account for differences in substitutability between securities.If ma-
turity differences areheldconstant, then the substitutability or the cross
elasticity of demand ought also to be constant. In contrast, the expec-
tations hypothesis implies that a seven-year security is more like an
eight-year security than a one-year security is like a two-year security.
The expectations hypothesis implies that the common element in two
securities separated by a year in maturity increases monotonically as
term to maturity increases.
Similarly, if one accepts the view that liquidity preference varies
with the level of rates, then the premium increases as the level of
rates increases. Hence, if securities separated by a year in term to
maturity are examined, one should expect the common element to
increase as term to maturity increases. Because both liquidity pref-
erence and expectations have common implications,thistest does
not discriminate between them. It does, however, produce evidence
that must be regarded as discriminating between expectations and
liquidity preference on the one hand and market segmentation on
the other.
The foregoing tests were performed with two independent sets
of data: the Durand data that Meiselman used and yields to ma-
turity, for the latest cycle, read off the yield curve in the Treasury
Bulletin by a draftsman. The test employed was a simple rank test.
The expectations and liquidity preference hypotheses imply that the
correlations between securities separated by a year in term to maturity
ought to increase monotonically as term to maturity increases. Hence
the theory forecasts a set of ranks that can be compared with the
observed ranks to see if they are positively correlated.
Consistent results were obtained using these independent sets of
data. The ranks predicted by the expectations and liquidity preference372 Essays on interest Rates
hypotheses and the actual ranks were highly correlated. Each set of
data consisted of nine pairs of ranks. Using the Olds rank correlation
test, and interpreting the implications of the liquidity preference and
expectations as implying a one-tail test, both significance levels were
under 2 per cent.32
The foregoing analysis of the implications of liquidity preference
and expectations for the correlation between the yields of securities
separated by a constant time span as term to maturity increases also
implies that yield curves ought to flatten out with maturity. Given that
the weights assigned to marginal rates of interest, in the determination
of average or internal rates of return, decrease with maturity, then
yield curves must flatten out with maturity. This assumes that the
variance in forward rates is independent of term to maturity.
The evidence presented supports the Hicksian theory of the term
structure of interest rates; it supports the view that both expectations
and liquidity preference determine the term structure of interest rates.
These results show that forward rates should be interpreted as expected
rates plus a liquidity premium. If forward rates are so interpreted, then
the expectations of the market seem to forecast subsequently observed
short-maturity spot rates; the relationship between expected and sub-
sequently observed spot rates cannot be rationalized as the workings of
chance.
With respect to the market segmentation hypothesis, the evidence is
less clear. These findings show that this hypothesis is not of the same
magnitude as liquidity preference and expectations in the determination
of the term structure of rates. The fact that forward rates embody
short-term forecasts of spot rates that have a perceptible degree of ac-
curacy implies that liquidity premiums are stable. Hence, the scope for
the impact of market segmentation upon the term structure of rates
must be limited. The Meiselman findings on the relationship between
what he termed forecast revisions and errors support this view, as do
the tests presented here
A proponent of market segmentation may argue that these tests, in
particular, the test based on holding absolute maturity differences con-
stant while varying relative maturity differences, are based on incorrect
interpretations of market segmentation. Economic literature does not
contain a statement of the market segmentation hypothesis that is as
rigorous as those available either for liquidity preference or expecta-
32Thetest employed is described in W. Allen Wallis, "Rough-and-Ready Sta-
tistical Tests," Industrial Quality Control, March, 1952.Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 373
tions. Therefore, the possibility of misinterpretation cannot be easily
dismissed. The Walker findings which deal with the root of the market
segmentation hypothesis are particularly relevant. He showed that in-
stitutions have sharply changed the maturity composition of their hold-
ings in response to market forces. This seems to strike at the very
foundation of the market segmentation thesis. The only contrary evi-
dence uncovered—this is also subject to the same uncertainties about
its relevance—is the existence of negative forward rates in the bill
market. Such occurrences seem to be rare, and therefore relatively in-
significant, but should not be dismissed entirely. There is always the
possibility that more of such evidence exists or that the effects of
market segmentation are relatively subtle and the tests employed too
crude to detect its existence.83
THE APPLICATION OF THE LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE
AND EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESES TO THE
CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF INTEREST RATES
Applications of the Lutz-Meiselman Model
If both liquidity effects and incorrect expectations are disregarded, one
should expect to find that long-term rates are higher than short-term
rates when the latter are low and lower than short-term rates when the
latter are high; in the absence of trends in interest rates, the average
yields of short- and long-term rates should be equal. Insofar as short-
term rates are relatively low about cyclical troughs and high about
peaks, yield curves ought to be negatively sloped at peaks and positively
sloped at troughs. Peaks and troughs in specific cycles of short-term
rates should be anticipated by movements in long-term rates. If the
market anticipates increases or decreases in short-term rates, long-
term rates should move in advance in the same direction. Hence, if peaks
and troughs in short-term. rates are coincident with the reference cycle,
peaks and troughs in long-term rates ought to lead the business cycle,
and the longer the maturity, the greater the lead. The reasoning here is
the same as that which led Macaulay to expect time money rates to
lead call money rates.
There were negative forward rates in the bill market in the 1930's. At that
time rates were relatively low and taxes on bank deposits in Illinois were high
enough to make it profitable to take a negative yield rather than be subject to
taxation on deposits.374 Essays on Interest Rates
Analytically, the 91-day rate can be regarded as a spot or instan-
taneous rate of interest which reflects money market conditions at
specific phases of the cycle. In contrast, the yield on long-term goverm
ments represents an average of the current and expected spot rates over
the course of three or four reference cycles. Because the term to ma-
turity of long-term governments is longer -than the usual reference cycle,
the yields of these securities reflect an average of spot rates during both
expansions and contractions. Hence, long-term rates vary relatively
less than short-term rates. Money market conditions during a specific
phase of a cycle are largely "averaged out" (the effects of abnormally
low or high spot rates largely cancel) in the determination of the long-
term rate. In contrast, money market conditions during specific cycle
phases are completely reflected in bill yields. As a result, short-term
rates ought to be more variable over the cycle than long-term rates.
The expectations hypothesis implies that the shorter the term to ma-
turity of a security, the smaller the number of spot rates that are
averaged in order to determine its yield; consequently, the larger its
variance over the cycle. Cyclical movements in the short- relative to the
long-term rate can be analyzed as if the latter were a permanent or
normal rate of interest and the short-term rate contained a large
transitory component. This transitory component is largest about peaks
and troughs. When positive, at peaks, short-term rates are high relative
to long-term rates; when negative, at troughs, short-term rates are rel-
atively low.34
"Thisimplies that the correlation between a moving average of short- and
long-term rates over the cycle would be greater than the correlation between
current short- with long-term rates. A moving average would abstract from
cyclical effects on short-term rates;it would depict permanent short-term rates
and abstract from transitoryeffects.Italso would, of course,reducethe
amplitude of the fluctuations in short- relative to long-term rates; in effect,it
converts short- to long-term rates.
The view that the long-term rate is an average of short-term rates explains
why Hicks found that time series of short- and long-term rates were less strongly
correlated than averages of past and present short-term rates (both weighted and
unweighted) and long-term rates. Presumably averages reflect expectations of
"permanent" short-term rates. Hence, they are more like long-term rates than
actual short-term rates which embody a transitory component that is negative
at troughs and positive at peaks. See Hicks, bp.cit.,p. 28. Hawtrey's position
is similar to that of Charles C. Abbott, "A Note on the Government Bond
Market," Review of Economic Statistics, Vol. 17, 1935, p. 9. Both reasoned that
the forces that affect short maturity yields are largely independent of the forces
that affect long maturity yields because fluctuations in short-term rates are much
greater than those in long-term rates.Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 375
The market regards current short-term rates as abnormally high
when they are above long-term rates, and expects them to fall in the
future. At such times, holders of long-term securities expect to win
capital gains because the passage of time will eliminate the abnormally
high short-term rates from the average of present and future short-term
rates that is the long-term rate. The opposite occurs when short-term
rates are relatively low; i.e., the holders of long-term securities expect
to incur capital losses as low short-term rates are eliminated from the
average that is the long-term rate.
This does not, in itself, imply that it is more profitable to hold long-
than short-term securities when rates are expected to falL If the ex-
pectations of the market are correct, then the high yields of short- rel-
ative tc long-term securities would just offset expected capital gains on
the latter. The yield differential in this case represents what the market
thinks is necessary to equalize the holding period yields of these se-
curities, taking into account both coupons and capital gains. Con-
versely, when short-term rates are abnormally low, they are expected to
rise. The abnormally large yield advantage of long-term securities in
this what the market thinks is necessary to offset the
expected capital losses attributable to holding them. Whether or not the
holding period yields of short-term relative to long-term securities are
greater or less over the cycle depends upon which way the market
erred in predicting future short-term rates. A fall in short-term rates
that is larger than anticipated favors the holders of long-term securities,
and vice versa.
These implications of the expectations hypothesis for the cyclical
behavior of interest rates are in part incorrect because liquidity pref-
erence is not an independent variable in the analysis. Yet they go far
towards providing an interpretation of the behavior of yield differentials
between long- and short-term governments since 1920. In particular,
they further our understanding of the sharp movements in short-term
rates that occurred during this time.
In the 1920's there were two periods when short-term rates were
above long-term rates (see Chart 6-5). During 1920, and again in 1929,
the market anticipated lower future short-term rates. Although the
absolute level of short-term rates during 1920 was about seventy-five
basis points higher than it was in 1929, the anticipated fall was much
greater in 1929. The yield advantage of short-term over long-term
securities in 1929 was at least twice as great as it was in 1921. The
fallin short-term rates from 1929 to 1931 was about 450 basis376 Essays on Interest Rates
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points, whereas the fall from 1920 to 1922 was about 275 basis
points. Both downward movements were greater than the other de-
clines in short-term rates during this period.
In more recent years (1957 and 1959), short-term rates were again
higher than long-term rates (see Chart 6-6). The absolute level of
rates was higher in 1959 but the yield differential between long-
and short-term securities was about the same. The subsequent down-
ward movements in short-term rates were of roughly equal magnitude,
about 275 basis points, and were the largest declines since the 1920's.
In the 1930's, short-term relative to long-term rates were especially
low. This was a consequence of abnormally low short-term rates; they
were at historical lows.
The implications of a pure expectations model for the cyclical
behavior of interest rates are inconsistent with the following obser-
vations: (1 )shortmaturities yield less over the cycle than long ma-
turities; yield curves are more often than not positively sloped; (2)
short-term ratesfailto exceed long-term ratesat peaks as much
as they fall below long-term rates at troughs; (3) the variance over
the cycle in yields of three-month Treasury billsisless than the

































































































































1Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 379
rates are above long-term rates,itis not the shortest term to ma-
turity that bears the highest yield, i.e., yield curves at first rise with
term to maturity and then fall; (5) long-term rates fail to lead turning
points in short-term rates.
Applications of the Hicks Model
Cyclical Behavior of Governments
To explain these observations, liquidity preference must be added
to the analysis. This implies that interest rates no longer measure
the total return derived from holding securities. Securities also yield
a nonpecuniary or liquidity income to their holders. The evidence
presented indicates that the nonpecuniary return from securitiesis
inversely related to term to maturity and directly related to the level
of pecuniary yields. The shorter the term to maturity, the larger the
fraction of the total return from a security that is nonpecuniary, and
vice versa. The higher the level of interest rates, the wider the spread
between the total return from a security and its pecuniary yield, and
vice versa.
If, abstracting from differences in expectations of future short-term
rates, the total return attributable to all maturities is the same, i.e., the
sum of pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns is equal for all terms to
maturity, then the pecuniary yield must be an increasing function of
term to maturity. Therefore, if expectations have a random effect on
yield curves, the average yield curve will be positively sloped, and short-
term rates will, on the average, be lower than long-term rates. The inter-
action of expectations and liquidity preference to produce a "normal"
yield curve is shown in Chart 6-7. The "total return" curve is flat; it
depicts a market in which future short-term rates are expected to be
the same as the current rates. The liquidity yield is the fraction of total
yields for any given maturity that is nonpecuniary. Subtracting the non-
pecuniary component from total return leaves the pecuniary yield curve,
which is the yield curve observed in the market.35
Liquidity return as a percentage of total return was obtained by first fitting
a yield curve to average yields as a function of term to maturity for the three
latest reference cycles. Then the ratios of yields for particular maturities to
twenty-year government bond yields were computed. The difference between the
ratio for any given term to maturity and one constitutes the fraction of total
yield that is nonpecuniary for that term to maturity.380 Essays on Interest Rates
CHART 6—7. "Normal" or Average Yield Curve
Interestrates
Liquidity preference produces asymmetry in the relationship between
short- and long-term rates at cycle peaks and troughs. It accounts for
the failure of short-term rates to exceed long-term rates at peaks by as
much as they fall below long-term rates at troughs.
At cyclical troughs, both liquidity and expectational forces operate
independently to establishshort-term rates below long-term rates.
Liquidity preference produces a pecuniary yield differential of long-
term over short-term securities. At troughs, the market regards the
current short-term rate as abnormally low and expects it to be higher
in the future. Hence, expectations also push short-term below long-
term rates. Both effects operate to widen the spread between these
rates (Chart 6-8). The total-return curve slopes positively because
the market expects future yields on short maturities, both pecuniary
and nonpecuniary, to be higher than current short maturity yields. Sub-
tracting the liquidity component from the total yield curve produces
a market yield curve with a long-short differential greater than the
differential for the corresponding total yield curve.
At cyclical peaks, in contrast to cyclical troughs, liquidity and ex-
pectational forces produce opposite effects on yield curves. Liquidity
preference, as always, operates to establish short-term below long-
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CHART 6—8. Yield Curve at Cyclical Troughs
Interestrates
term rates. However, expectations act in the opposite direction. Be-
cause the market expects future short-term rates to be lower, the
total yield curve declines as a function of term to maturity. Whether
or not the resulting market yield curve is rising, falling, or both depends
upon the relative strength of these opposing forces. Because these forces
work in opposite directions at cyclical peaks but in the same direction
at troughs, short-term yields do not exceed long-term yields at peaks
as much as they fall below long-term yields at troughs.
The foregoing analysis implies that flat market yield curves should
be interpreted as indicating that the market expects future pecuniary
yields of short maturities to be lower than current short-term rates.
With no change in expectations, the fraction of the total return that
is nonpecuniary for a forward rate which pertains to a specific period
of calendar time will rise with the passage of time. Hence, its pecuniary
yield will fall below current spot rates. A flat market yield curve is
shown in Chart 6-9. A falling total-return curve is a necessary condition
for its existence.
Charts 6-10 and 6-11 depict yield curves with segments that are
negatively sloped (yield curves with such shapes are also referred to
as humped). Such curves are produced by expectations of sharply
5 6
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CHART 6—11. Effects of Alternative Expectations of Falling Rates Upon
the Shape of Yield Curves
falling interest rates, i.e., interest rates that are falling more sharply
than those in Chart 6-8. The more sharply interest rates are expected
to fall, the shorter the term to maturity of the peak in yields; the
more gradual the expected fall, the further out on the yield curve
peak will be.If the expected fallin short-term ratesis very
gradual, no negative segment appears. Yield curves with negative seg-
ments have been relatively rare, at least since the 1920's; expectations
of interest-rate declines are usually not sharp enough to offset the
effects of liquidity preference.
Liquidity preference also explains why the shortest term to ma-
turityis not the highest yielding security in the term structure at
cyclical peaks. In order for a yield curve to exist that has the shortest
term to maturity bearing the highest yield, expectations of extremely
sharp declines in short-term rates are required. Such expectations, while
a theoretical possibility, did not exist during the two most recent
cyclical peaks and possibly have never existed.
The liquidity preference hypothesis implies that nonpecuniary yields
are a decreasing function of term to maturity. Hence, the range of
Interest rotes
5
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pecuniary yields that will be observed in the market will increase
with term to maturity. For example, suppose liquidity yields for Treas-
ury bills and nine- to twelve-month governments areatall times
50 and 25 per cent of total returns. Further, assume that total returns,
which are of course not directly observable in the market, range from
4 to 8 per cent. Pecuniary yields will then range from 2 to 4 per cent
for bills, and from 3 to 6 per cent for nine- to twelve-month govern-
ments. Hence, liquidity preference implies that the variance in yields
over the cycle increases with term to maturity.
The expectations hypothesis implies just the opposite:that the
shorter the term to maturity, the greater the variance. Therefore, the
actual variance observed in the market for any specified term to ma-
turity represents a composition of these conflicting forces. The available
evidence on variance as a function of term to maturity suggests that
liquidity effects dominate expectational effects for governments with
maturities equal to or less than nine-to-twelve months. For three- to
five-year governments and longer maturities, expectational effects dom-
inate. The absence of time series between these maturity ranges pre-
cludes a precise estimate here of the borderline separating the domains
of dominance of expectations and liquidity.
During expansions, yield differentials between Treasury bills and nine-
to twelve-month governments widen. Insofar as liquidity effects dom-
inate expectational effects,liquidity premiums ought to widen from
trough to peak since, according to the liquidity preference hypothesis,
they are an increasing function of the absolute level of interest rates.
Consequently, if only liquidity effects are at work, the differentials be-
tween bills and nine- to twelve-month governments would increase
more than the increases observed. Adding expectations to the analysis
implies, given the assumption that the market can recognize transitorily
high or low levels of spot rates, the addition of an opposing force.
Converse implications are implied for contractions. Liquidity operates
to narrow, and expectations to widen, the spread between bills and
nine- to twelve-month governments. Since liquidity is dominant for
this maturity range, the observed spreads decrease during contractions.
For evidence on how these differentials have actually behaved, see
Charts 6-6 and 6-12.
These findings for governments do not necessarily apply to corpo-
rates or to the issues of government agencies unless the nonpecuniary
component of total yield is the same. In general, governments appear
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either agency issuesor corporates.3° Among short-term securities,
governments have a comparative liquidity advantage over agencies or
corporates. The bill market has very low transactions costs and bid
and asked prices are firm for extremely large transactions. This suggests
that when yield curves are humped, the peak in yields will have a longer
term to maturity for corporates than for governments.
In the absence of liquidity premiums, and assuming the market can
forecast turning points in the specific cycles of interest rates, cyclical
peaks in long-term rates would precede those of short-term rates and
would be observable first. Similarly, troughs in long-term rates would
precede troughs. in short-term rates. The rationale that Macaulay used
to argue that the seasonal peak in time money rates should precede
that in call money rates is relevant here. Insofar as the market can
predict turning points in short-term rates, the long-term rate (which
is an average of future short-term rates) should reach its peak first in
anticipation of the peak in short-term rates.
When liquidity preference is introduced into the analysis, however,
the sequence in the timing of peaks and troughs of long- and short-
term securities becomes less obvious. If liquidity premiums are a func-
tion of spot rates, then an amount is added to long-term rates which
increases as short-term rates increase and reaches a peak when the
latter reach their peak. The peak in long-term rates must occur later,
therefore, than it would have occurred in a world of pure expectations.
How much later this peak will occur can only be partially determined
by a priori reasoning. It is clear that the peak in long-term rates should
not occur after the peak in short-term rates. Since the maximum
amount that will be added to long-term rates because of liquidity pref-
erence will occur when short-term rates reach their peak, the peak in
long-term rates must either precede or be synchronous with that of
short-term rates.
Since the end of World War II, the behavior of time series of govern-
36Theevidence for the proposition that agency issues are less liquid than
governments is of two kinds. (1) Agencies have higher transactions costs. The
spread between bid and asked prices, as reported in dealer quotation sheets,
ranges from two-thirty-seconds for short-term securities to a whole point, the
equivalent of ten dollars, for long-term securities. (2) The value of agencies as
collateral for bank loans is poorer than it is for governments. Per dollar of bor-
rowing, the market value of collateral in the form of agencies, term to maturity
aside, is higher than it is for governments. The Joint Economic Committee Study
of the Dealer Market, p. 95, reports that the margin requirements for agencies
are 5 per cent.Cyclical Behavior 0/the Term Structure 387
ments with various terms to maturity indicates that all securities, ir-
respective of maturity, reach their peaks and troughs synchronously.
Hence, without going further into the question of whether liquidity
premiums add enough to long-term rates to delay their peaks until
all peaks are synchronous, irrespective of term to maturity, one cannot
say, using this evidence alone, whether the market can or cannot pre-
dict turning points in interest rates. In view of the inability of the
market to predict turning points of other series, on balance, it seems
reasonable to interpret these findings as being consistent with the view
that the market cannot predict turning points in specific cycles of in-
terest rates.37
Cyclical Behavior of Agency issues and Corporates
The thesis has been advanced that liquidity premiums are caused
primarily by a desire to avoid the risk of capital loss. The evidence
indicates that yield differentials, when only liquidity differences exist,
increase with the absolute level of rates. The observations of an upward
trend in liquidity premiums for the three latest cycles, and regressions
of liquidity premiums upon spot rates, show that liquidity premiums in-
crease when interest rates increase. This thesis has implications for
the cyclical and secular behavior of other rates of interest. It implies
that low-quality bonds ought to yield more, the cycle aside, than high-
quality bonds because they are relatively less liquid, i.e., price variance
is greater as a result of the greater default risk. Consequently, it should
be possible to observe that high-quality bonds yield less than low-
quality bonds generally and that the yield differential between high-
and low-quality bonds increases from trough to peak, and decreases
from peak to trough. By symmetrical reasoning, the spread between
government agency issues and governments, ignoring term to maturity,
should increase with the absolute level of interest rates.
To test one of these propositions, yield differentials between govern-
ments and government agency issues were regressed against their
sums. The results of this test are mixed. For nine- to twelve-month
The highest correlation (.98) of seasonally adjusted time series for three-
month Treasury bills with nine- to twelve-month governments was obtained by
assuming the series to be synchronous. The correlations with one-, two-, and
three-month leads and lags were: .95 for one month, .90 for two, and .83 for
three. No difference, to two decimal places, was observed for leads and lags of
equal duration.388 Essays on Interest Rates
maturities, the spreads between governments on the one hand, and
Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal Land Bank, and
Federal Home Loan Bank issues on the other, are consistent with the
hypothesis advanced; spreads increase as the absolute level of interest
rates increases. The same is true for maturities ten years and over.
The best results were obtained by regressing the yield differential be-
tween a government bond, the three and one-quarter of 1983, and an
index of AA utility yields of bonds with coupons of three and one-
eighth to three and three-eighths against their sum. The correlation
was positive and 40 per cent of the variation in the spread was ex-
plained.88 However, for three- to five-year governments and FLB and
FNMA issues, the slopes of the regression coefficients were negative,
one significantly so.
The consequences of changes in the level of interest rates for yield
differentials between low- and high-quality bonds over the cycle is
somewhat more difficult to detect. During contractions, the level of
rates falls and the market usually increases its estimates of the risks of
default by the issuers of securities. Conversely, the level of
rates rises during expansions and the market usually decreases its es-
timates of the risks of default. Hence, liquidity and cyclical forces work
in opposite directions upon yield differentials. During the post-World
War II period, the revaluation of risks over the cycle has dominated
liquidity forces. Hence, the yields of Baa Moody's bonds, forall
categories, have fluctuated less than corresponding Aaa bonds.
The behavior of low- and high-quality bond yield differentials over
time seems to support the view that the level of rates and these dif-
ferentials are related. Since 1945, the spread between Moody's AAA
and BAA series has increased with. the level of interest rates. The re-
gression of the difference on the sum indicates that the difference
rises with the level of rates.
Prewar investigations of the relationship between the yield differ-
ential of high and low grade bonds and the level of interest rates also
conforms to this finding.
All of the agency issues exhibited a significant downward trend over time in
yield differentials compared with governments. Presumably this reflects the diffu-
sion of knowledge about the investment merits of these securities that has oc-
curred in recent years. The data for the agencies consist of incomplete series,
mostly for the last decade, compiled by Charles E. Quincey and Co., and Allen
Knowles, the fiscal agent of the Federal Home Loan Banks. The AA utility series
is compiled by Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure 389
Ratios of promised yields (or yield spreads) to the basic rates on high.
grade issues deserve more attention than they can be given in this report.
According to the classical theory of investment values, the simple yield
spread, or algebraic difference between the promised yield and basic rate,
would provide the best measure of the risk premium for issues properly
priced in the market, since the yield is conceived of as the algebraic sum
of the pure rate of interest and the risk premium. It is a matter of record,
however, that yield spreads frequently narrow when basic rates fall, and
widen when basic rates rise..., perhapsbecause of the efforts of investors
to compensate for changes in basic rates.3°
For any preassigned cyclical downturn in bill rates, yield differ-
entials between low and high grade bonds should decrease most during
severe and least during mild contractions. Conversely, during strong
upturns, the differential ought to increase more for sharp than for mild
recoveries. The data on the behavior of differentials between low and
high grade bonds, since the end of World War II, while they support
the view that there has been a secular rise in the differential, do not
support the view that the differential is at a maximum at peaks and
minimum at troughs. In fact, the maximum differential seems to appear
midway between the cyclical peak and the trough. This seems to be
accounted for by differences between low and high grade bonds in the
timing of their specific cycle peaks and troughs. In the postwar period,
specific cycle peaks and troughs of high grade bonds consistently pre-
ceded those of low grade bonds. Hence, the maximum yield differential
between the two could not have been associated with business cycle
turning points.40
39W. Braddock Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality and investor Experience,
Princeton University Press for NBER, 1958, p. 288. For further discussion, see
the following pages.
'°Partof the increase in the measured yield differential between low and high
grade bonds is attributable to differences between the economic, as distinguished
from the temporal, term to maturity of these bonds. If calendar term to maturity
is the same for both grades, then economic term to maturity, which Macaulay
termed duration, must be shorter on the lower grade issues. (See Movements of
interest Rates, Chapter II, for a discussion of this point.) The weights assigned
to receipts in the near, relative to the distant, future for computing yield to
maturity is greater for low than high-quality bonds. Hence, a rise in rates during
an expansion, with no change in investor attitudes towards risk, will increase
measured yield differentials for the same that yields of three- to five-year
governments rise relative to twenCy-year governments during an expansion. This
same point explains why the market believes that if interest rates are expected
to fall, securities with equal yields and terms to maturity will have different390 Essays on Interest Rates
Hickman's investigation of the relationship between low and high
grade bond yields over time suggests that the long run rate of return
to investors in low grade bonds is greater than itis for high grade
bonds. He concludes that "the highest returns were obtained by in-
vestors who could afford to take the greatest risks."4' He found that
both the variance and the average rate of return was greatest for in-
vestments in low grade bonds. In this respect, his finding is symmetrical
with the relationship between long- and short-term government yields,
taking into account both capital gains and interest receipts.
relative price rises if their coupons are not the same. The size of the coupons
will be inversely related to the rate of change of capital values.
In fact, this phenomenon seems to account for a trivial portion of the cyclical
variation in the yield differential between low- and high-quality bonds. To de-
termine the quantitative importance of this effect, a constant risk differential of
I per cent for all spot and forward rates was assumed for two hypothetical ten-
year bonds. At peaks, the higher grade bond was assumed to consist of a six-
month spot rate of 5 per cent, with the first forward rate being 4.5 per cent and
all succeeding forward rates, 4 per cent. At troughs, the higher grade bond was
assumed to consist of a six-month spot rate of 2 per cent, with the first for-
ward rate being 3 per cent and all succeeding forward rates 4 per cent. The
yield to maturity of these two postulated securities differed by ninety-eight basis
points at troughs, and one hundred and two at peaks.
41Hickman,op. cit., p. 138.